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ever, that the state may prove the absence of necessity by circumstantial evidence,"z
and it has been held that the operation was unnecessary where the evidence indicated
that the doctor did not ascertain whether an infection had set in before operating and
the woman had been healthy prior thereto,' where the only evidence of indisposition
was a headache and indigestion.'3 On the other hand, the good health and physical
condition of the woman will not be presumed in the absence of testimony tending to
show them.4
While Anglo-American law emphasizes the crime against society for thwarting the
process of procreation, that of the Soviet Union and Germany is apparently more concerned with the interests of the mother. French law, however, since the earlyNapoleonic
codes, has been severe. In the Soviet Union abortions were virtually legalized, prohibited only where the pregnancy is of more than three months' duration or within six
months of a prior operation.'s Although the German Code does not provide for exceptions to the general prohibition, 6 in a recent case, similar to one in the United States in
which the defendant was convicted,17 where there was danger of suicide due to pregnancy resulting from extra-marital relations, the court held that if the abortion was the
indispensable means for saving the mother's life, the operation by the doctor was not
unlawful.' 8 The result was achieved by applying sec. 54 of the German Criminal Code
relating generally to the defense of necessity to preserve life. The French Code likewise
permits no exceptions,'9 but in contrast to the liberal interpretation of the German
court, a conviction was recently sustained although the operation was performed for
"medical purposes."2o
It is hoped that the reforms to be suggested by the Interdepartmental Committee
in England following their investigation" after this significant decision, will eliminate
the necessity of awkward statutory constructions by courts as in the instant case, and
inspire American legislatures to take similar action.
Equity-Vendor and Purchaser-Relief against Forfeiture-[England].-The
plaintiff contracted to buy land in Tasmania from the defendant for £321,ooo, which
was to be paid in instalments. The agreement expressly provided that time was of the
x Gammack v. State, 6 N.E. (2d) 328 (Ind. 1937); Diehl v. State, 157 Ind. 549, 62 N.E. 5i
(Igoi); Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind. 189, 27 N.E. 866 (i8gi); State v. Bly, 99 Minn. 74, io8 N.W.
833 (I9o6); Dixon v. State, 46 Neb. 298, 64 N.W. 961 (1895); State v. Longstreth, 19 N.D. 268,
121 N.W. III4 (I909); State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186, 37 AtI. 75 (1897); State v. Watson, 30 Kan.
281, i Pac. 770 (x883); State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, ioo Pac. 68i, ig Ann. Cas. 631 (1909).
12 State v. Powers,
55 Wash. 63, 282 Pac. 439 (1929) "The authorities are to the effect that
when it is shown that the woman was healthy and in a normal condition and medicine was administered or an operation performed on her to procure a miscarriage the evidence is sufficient
to find that the miscarriage was not necessary to save the woman's life."
13 State v. Martin, 178 Wash. 290, 3 4 P. (2d) 914 (i934).
'4 State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, ioo Pac. io8i (19o9).
ISIn 1936, however, the Soviet Union completely reversed its policy and abortion is now
illegal except where performed to save the mother's life or where there is an inheritable disease
in the family.
16 German Criminal Code § 218.
17 Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380 (1891).
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9 Code Penal art. 317 (1923) Petite Collection Dalloz.
20 Taussig, Abortion Spontaneous and Induced 424 (1936).

2 186 L.T. 87 (z938).
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essence, and that on any default in payment the vendor could either resell the land and
hold the vendee for any deficiency, or could rescind the agreement and all payments
already made on the contract would be forfeited. After paying £i39,5oo of the purchase price, and after receiving one parcel of the land, to which £99,30o of the purchase
money was attributable, the plaintiff defaulted. The defendant notified him that it
rescinded the agreement pursuant to its terms, and that the payments were forfeited.
Five years later the plaintiff instituted this suit for restitution of the payments. Held,
for the defendant. Mussen v. Van Dieman's Land Co.,
In refusing relief the court said that there is nothing unjust or unconscionable in
enforcing the provision for forfeiture since in so doing it was merely carrying out the
terms of the contract. But in Steedmat
v. Drinkle,2 where the agreement, like that in
the instant case, provided that time was of the essence and that upon default the
vendor could determine the contract and keep the payments, the Privy Council said
"the stipulation for forfeiture ....was in the nature of a penalty against which relief
should be granted." The High Court of Justice in the present case distinguished that
decision on the fact that there the vendee had tendered the purchase-money and had
sued for specific performance, and said that only when the purchaser is able and
willing to perform is it unconscionable for the vendor to retain the payments. Since
English courts will not grant specific performance to a party in default where time is
"of the essence,"3 as in the principal case, to require tender of performance as a condition precedent to granting relief is to demand a useless form. Since the holding
in the Steedinan case committed English courts to the view that the purchaser's
equity should be protected, the present holding seems unjustifiable since it denies
relief to the one who needs it most-the impecunious vendee, to whom it is a great
burden to comply with the form of proffering payment.
In a majority of the American cases a purchaser in possession has been relieved
against provisions making time essential.4 In jurisdictions where even after default
specific performance is decreeds the requirement of tender may be justified as a proof
of the plaintiff's good faith in demanding restitution, and to show that he is not merely
trying to escape from a bad bargain because of a drop in the market value of the land.
Most American courts deny restitution of payment-, however, where time is stipulated to be of the essence. 6
It has been said that ordering repayment in these cases, by adding an element of
uncertainty to bargaining,? would result in injustice to the vendor since he may have
invested the advance payments or otherwise have changed his position. But, since
the purchaser "is not entitled to a return of his purchase-money until he has allowed,
as a deduction therefrom, all damages caused by his breach," 8 the vendor is protected.
1.54 T.L.R. 225 (1938).
2 [916] A.C. 275.
3 See cases collected i Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction 335, n. 1 (1904); Pomeroy,
Specific Performance § 389 (3d ed. 1926); Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] A.C. 275.
43 Williston, Contracts § 791, cases cited n. rS.
s E.g., Cheney v. Libby, 134 U.S. 68 (i8go); Mound Mines Co. v. Hawthorne, 173 Fed. 887
(C.C.A. 8th igog); Edgerton v. Peckham, xiPaige (N.Y.) 352.
63 Williston, op. cit. supranote 4, at § 852, n. 7, 8.
7Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 Harv. L. Rev. T17,
135 (1915).
8
Lytle v. Scottish American Mtge. Co., 122 Ga. 458, 469, 5o S.E. 402, 407 (1905).
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The vendee must show that the amount retained is greater than the injury done. The
court refused to consider that question here, although the defendant asserted that its
damage was greater than the sum paid.
Where, as appears probable in this case, performance has progressed far enough to
shift the risk of loss to the purchaser,9 the relief granted to the defaulting purchasemoney mortgagor presents a strong analogy."o There seems to be no good reason why
the policy of relieving mortgagors and defaulting contractors under building contracts and buyers of chattels by conditional sale should not also be applicable to this
situation.Evidence-Unreasonable Search and Seizure-Admissibility in Civil Proceedings
-[Federal].--Federal officers obtained liquor on the defendant's premises under an
illegally issued search warrant. Criminal proceedings for unlawful possession of spirits
were instituted by the United States and abandoned; the defendant secured the return
of the liquor so obtained. The United States then brought assumpsit proceedings
against the defendant for non-payment of duties on the liquor. Much of the evidence
obtained under the illegally issued warrant was admitted in this suit. The District
Court awarded judgment for the United States, and the defendant appealed. Held,
reversed and remanded. The use of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search of
the defendant's premises was reversible error. Rogers v. United Slates.'
The instant case sets squarely before the court the alternatives of either limiting
the rule excluding evidence obtained by an unreasonable search 2 to criminal proceedings, or extending it to include suits of a civil nature. As authority for its decision
to expand the rule the court adduces the case of Silverthorne v. United States.3 The
question there under consideration was whether or not photographs of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search could be used to force production of the originals at
criminalproceedings. In nullifying the attempt by the prosecution to legalize in two
steps what was illegal in one, Justice Holmes said: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely evidence so obtained
shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all." There is no indication that he was adverting to use of .the evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding;
no such question was before him.
9 See DUller, Legislation and Risk of Loss Cases, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 26o (1938).
lo For examples of use of this analogy see Lytle v. Scottish American Mtge. Co., 122 Ga.
458, 5o S.E. 4o2 (1905); Walker v. Casgrain, ioi Mich. 604, 6o N.W. 291 (1894); Wilder v.
Haughey, 21 Minn. ioi ([874); Button v. Schroyer, 5 Wis. 598 (r856). Cf. In re Dagenham
Dock Co. 8 Ch. App. 1022 (1873); Great West Lumber Co. v. Wilkins, 7 W.L.R. 166 (x908).
Also 3 Williston, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 791, 852.
11For discussions of problems presented by forfeiture clauses in land contracts see Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1921); Corbin, The Right of the
Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 Yale L.J. 1013 (1934); New York
Law Revision Comm'n Report for 1937, 343 ff.; 2 Chafee and Simpson, Cases on Equity
1248 ff. and authorities there cited; Rest. Contracts § 357 (i932).
r 97 F. (2d) 691 (C.C.A. 1st 1938).
'4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183, 2184 (2d ed. 1923 and supp. i934).
3 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

